*Result*: Channel abstractions for network security.

*Process algebraic techniques for distributed systems are increasingly being targeted at identifying abstractions that are adequate for both high-level programming and specification and security analysis and verification. Drawing on our earlier work in Bugliesi and Focardi, (2008), we investigate the expressive power of a core set of security and network abstractions that provide high-level primitives for specifying the honest principals in a network, while at the same time enabling an analysis of the network-level adversarial attacks that may be mounted by an intruder. We analyse various bisimulation equivalences for security that arise from endowing the intruder with: (i) different adversarial capabilities; and (ii) increasingly powerful control over the interaction among the distributed principals of a network. By comparing the relative strength of the bisimulation equivalences, we obtain a direct measure of the intruder's discriminating power, and hence of the expressiveness of the corresponding intruder model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Mathematical Structures in Computer Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)*